
# NetStable Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement

**Document:** NetStable CP/CPS, version 0.2 (DRAFT, not yet in force)
**Policy document OID:** `1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.1.1`
**Owner:** NetStable, LLC, Policy Authority (§1.5)
**Structure:** RFC 3647. A combined CP (what must be true) and CPS (how NetStable does it). Where the running PKI does not yet meet a statement, §10 lists the deviation and its fix; nothing in §10 may be silently dropped.


## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Overview

NetStable, LLC operates a private public-key infrastructure (the **NetStable PKI**) to sign what it ships: container images and their attestations (SBOM, provenance, vulnerability scans), documents (reports, security notices, release and compliance packages), product licences, and RFC 3161 time-stamps. It is **not** a publicly trusted CA and does not issue TLS server certificates. Relying parties trust it by explicitly installing the NetStable root (§2.2).

### 1.2 Document name and identification

| Item | OID |
|---|---|
| This CP/CPS | `1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.1.1` |
| Production HSM signer certificates | `1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.2.1` |
| Operator-issued subscriber certificates | `1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.2.2` |
| Test / development certificates | `1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.2.3` (test root only) |
| TSA policy | `1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.3.1` |
| Licence-signing EKU | `1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.4.1` |

Arc registry: `standards/oid-registry.md` (IANA PEN 48431).

### 1.3 PKI participants

- **Certification authorities.** One hierarchy:

  ```
  NetStable, LLC Root CA v2
  └─ NetStable Intermediate CA v2
     ├─ NetStable Code Signing Issuing CA v2      → image and document signers (everything cosign verifies), short-lived code-signing leaves
     ├─ NetStable Document Signing Issuing CA v2  → personal document / S-MIME / PDF certificates
     ├─ NetStable Timestamping Issuing CA v2      → TSA signer
     └─ NetStable Licensing Issuing CA v2         → licence signer (ceremony-only)
  ```

  Generation v2 was created on 2026-09-26. The v1 generation (NetStable, LLC Root CA v1, "Corporate" and frozen "Heliopolis" intermediates) remains trusted until its retirement date (`12` §3, Phase 4). OCSP responder certificates are issued by each issuing CA directly (RFC 6960 §4.2.2.2), so v2 has no separate OCSP issuing CA.
- **Registration authority.** The Operator (§5.2) performs all registration; there is no separate RA.
- **Subscribers.** (a) NetStable-controlled **signers**: HSM keys that sign artifacts on behalf of a product; (b) people or systems holding their own key who receive an operator-issued certificate.
- **Relying parties.** Customers, their deployment systems (admission controllers, Harbor), NetStable products verifying licences, and auditors.

### 1.4 Certificate usage

| Allowed | Prohibited |
|---|---|
| Signing container images, attestations, documents, packages, licences, time-stamps; personal document signing and S/MIME | TLS server or client authentication; issuing subordinate CAs to anyone but NetStable; any use by a party other than the subscriber |

### 1.5 Policy administration

- **Policy Authority:** NetStable, LLC, acting through its managing member (Julian Yates).
- **Contact:** `pki@netstable.io` (to be created) and the IANA PEN contact.
- **Approval:** the Policy Authority approves each version; approvals are recorded in this file's History (append-only, HR-DOC-007).
- **Review:** at least yearly and before any CA ceremony.

### 1.6 Definitions

- **Signer:** an end-entity certificate bound to a dedicated HSM key, used only to sign artifacts; it cannot issue certificates.
- **Ceremony:** a scripted, recorded session in which a CA key is used for anything other than routine online issuance.
- **Operator:** the person performing PKI operations (§5.2).

## 2. Publication and repository

### 2.1 Repository

- `https://pki.netstable.io/`: CA certificates (`/certs/`), signer certificates (`/signers/`), CRLs (`http://crl.netstable.io/`), OCSP (`http://ocsp.netstable.io/`), the signed trust manifest and bundle, Sigstore `trusted_root.json` and `signing_config.json`, verification policies, and **this CP/CPS**.
- `https://tsa.netstable.io/api/v1/timestamp`: time-stamping.

### 2.2 Publication of trust anchors

The root certificate and its SHA-256 fingerprint are published on the repository, in this document (§7.4), and in every product's documentation. Relying parties must verify the fingerprint through a second channel before installing the root.

### 2.3 Frequency

CA certificates: at ceremony. CRLs of online issuing CAs: at least every 24 hours and on every revocation. CRLs of the root and intermediate: at least every 6 months (§4.9). Manifest: on change and at least every 6 days. This CP/CPS: on each approved version.

### 2.4 Access control

Repository content is public read. Only the publishing service identity may write (§5.1).

## 3. Identification and authentication

### 3.1 Naming

Subject DNs: `C=US, ST=Virginia, L=Woodbridge, O=NetStable, LLC, OU=<function>, CN=<name>`. Names are meaningful and unique in the hierarchy. Signer certificates carry the product in the CN (for example "Heliopolis Image Signer v1") and a SAN URI identity `https://pki.netstable.io/signers/<name>`, which relying parties check. No anonymous or pseudonymous certificates.

### 3.2 Initial identity validation

- **Signers:** requested by the Policy Authority; the key is generated in the HSM, and the HSM attestation is archived with the issuance record.
- **Operator-issued certificates:** the Operator verifies the subscriber's identity directly (known employee or contractor, verified email/domain control) and receives a CSR; private keys are never sent to or generated by the Operator.

### 3.3 Re-key and 3.4 revocation requests

Re-key uses a new key or key version and a new certificate; identity is re-validated as in §3.2. Revocation may be requested by the subscriber or the Policy Authority; the Operator authenticates the requester through a known channel.

## 4. Certificate life-cycle

- **Application and issuance:** online issuing CAs issue through step-ca on the CA host (loopback only, operator-authenticated). CA certificates are issued only at ceremonies.
- **Acceptance:** a signer certificate is accepted when published to the repository.
- **Key usage:** signer keys are used only by the identities granted for them (§6.2) and only for their stated purpose; subscribers keep their keys under their control.
- **Renewal:** signer certificates are renewed **with a new key or key version**; no certificate renewal on an unchanged key beyond its key-use period (§6.3).
- **Revocation (§4.9):** reasons per RFC 5280; `invalidityDate` records when a key is believed compromised, so signatures time-stamped earlier remain valid. Revocation is effective in the CRL immediately (online CAs) and in OCSP within 5 minutes.
- **Status services:** CRLs (full, HTTP) and OCSP (RFC 6960, delegated responder per CA). OCSP returns `revoked` (RFC 6960 §4.4.8 extended revoked) for serial numbers never issued.
- **Time-stamping:** `tsa.netstable.io` issues RFC 3161/RFC 5816 tokens under policy `1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.3.1`, SHA-256 or stronger imprints only (SHA-1 rejected), accuracy ±1 s. The TSA refuses to sign when its clock disagrees with NIST (UTC(NIST)) by more than 3 s.
- **Key escrow:** none.

## 5. Facility, management and operational controls

### 5.1 Physical and logical environment

CA and signer keys live in Cloud HSM (§6.2). The online CA host is a hardened virtual machine without public web ingress; its APIs are loopback-only. Public services (repository, CRL, OCSP, TSA) run behind a managed load balancer with rate limits. All infrastructure is defined in Terraform and Ansible (`terraform/`, `ansible/`).

### 5.2 Trusted roles and number of persons

| Role | Duties |
|---|---|
| Policy Authority | approves this CP/CPS, new CAs and signers, ceremonies |
| Operator | runs ceremonies, issues and revokes certificates, maintains services |
| Auditor | reviews logs and ceremony records; must not be the Operator |
| Witness | observes and attests ceremonies; holds no key access |

**Single-operator exception.** NetStable is a single-person organisation. The Policy Authority and Operator roles are held by one person. Multi-person control of CA keys, which industry and federal policies require, is replaced by the following **compensating controls**, all mandatory:

1. **No standing access to CA keys.** The Operator's everyday account holds no signing or destroy permission on any CA key. Access is granted only through a just-in-time Privileged Access Manager (PAM) entitlement, scoped to the one keyring, for at most one hour, with a written justification. Break-glass `owner` rights sit on a separate account, whose credentials are split: one part held by the Operator, one by an external custodian (for example the company's attorney).
2. **Root and intermediate keys disabled between ceremonies.** Their key versions are kept `DISABLED` and are enabled only inside a ceremony.
3. **Independent notification.** Every PAM grant, every use of a CA key outside step-ca, and every IAM change on the PKI projects raises an alert sent to the Operator **and** to an address outside NetStable's Google Workspace.
4. **Witnessed, recorded ceremonies.** Each ceremony follows a written script, is screen- and video-recorded, and is observed (in person or live video) by an external Witness who signs the ceremony record. Recordings and records are kept under a locked retention policy.
5. **Tamper-evident logs, externally reviewed.** KMS administrative and data-access logs are written to locked-retention storage; an external Auditor (for example a fractional CISO or accountant) reviews the log summary quarterly and signs off.
6. **Second approver when available.** As soon as a second trusted person exists (employee, contractor or advisor), PAM approval for CA keys requires that person's approval; the exception then ends for ceremonies.

This exception is reviewed at every yearly CP/CPS review.

### 5.3 Personnel

Trusted roles are held only by NetStable's managing member or persons under written agreement with NetStable. No background-check requirement beyond that is imposed.

### 5.4 Audit logging

Logged: every Cloud KMS administrative and data-access event (including every `AsymmetricSign`), PAM grants, IAM changes, step-ca issuance and revocation, OCSP and publisher service logs, TSA requests, ceremony actions. Logs are retained for at least **two years** in locked storage; BigQuery holds an analysable copy. Reviews: automated alerts continuously (§5.2), manual review quarterly.

### 5.5 Records archival

Ceremony records, HSM attestations, issued CA and signer certificates, CRLs and this CP/CPS's approved versions are archived until **three years after the issuing CA expires**, under a retention lock.

### 5.6 Key changeover

Issuing CAs stop issuing at their **issuance cut-off** (notAfter minus the longest permitted child validity minus 90 days) and are replaced by a new generation created at a ceremony before the cut-off.

### 5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery

- Key compromise: revoke the affected certificate, notify relying parties through the repository, re-key, publish new trust material; signatures time-stamped before the recorded `invalidityDate` remain valid.
- Service loss: the CA host is rebuilt from Terraform/Ansible and its daily snapshot; CRLs remain valid for 24 hours, which is the recovery-time budget for online CAs. HSM keys are regional or multi-regional (§6.2) and cannot be exported.
- A written disaster-recovery runbook is maintained.

### 5.8 CA termination

At least 90 days' notice on the repository; final CRLs published with a `nextUpdate` beyond the last certificate's expiry; repository kept online until then.

## 6. Technical security controls

### 6.1 Key generation

All CA and signer keys are generated **inside the HSM** and are non-exportable. The HSM's attestation for each key is archived (§5.5). Operator-issued subscriber keys are generated by the subscriber.

### 6.2 Private key protection

- **HSM:** Google Cloud KMS, protection level HSM, FIPS 140 Level 3. **Validation status: FIPS 140-2 Level 3, on NIST's Historical list since 2026-09-21** (see §10, T-01 for the rebuild decision).
- **Access:** per-key IAM, least privilege, defined in Terraform. One service identity per signer; CI identities restricted to protected release references; no user has standing signing rights on CA keys (§5.2).
- **Destruction protection:** 30-day (or longer) scheduled-destruction delay; destroy denied outside PAM; project lien.
- **Location:** new CA keys in the `us` multi-region location.

### 6.3 Other aspects of key-pair management: validity and key-use periods

| Certificate | Validity | Key-use period |
|---|---|---|
| Root | 20 years | issues only intermediate certificates and CRLs, at ceremonies |
| Intermediate | 12 years | issues issuing-CA certificates and CRLs, at ceremonies |
| Code, Document, Licensing Issuing CAs | 8 years | until issuance cut-off (§5.6) |
| Timestamping Issuing CA | 6 years | until issuance cut-off |
| Image and code signers | ≤ 13 months | same; new key version at each renewal |
| Document signers | ≤ 2 years | same |
| Licence signer | ≤ 3 years | same |
| TSA signer certificate | ≤ 90 days | TSA key used ≤ 15 months, then destroyed |
| OCSP responder | ≤ 7 days | same |
| Operator-issued code-signing leaves | ≤ 24 hours | same |
| Operator-issued document / S/MIME | ≤ 1 year | same |

### 6.4 Activation data

No passwords protect HSM keys; activation is by IAM identity and PAM grant. step-ca provisioner credentials are stored in Secret Manager, readable only by the Operator's privileged role.

### 6.5 Computer security and 6.6 life-cycle controls

Hosts are built from code (Rocky Linux 9, hardened baseline), patched automatically, with persistent journald and centralised logs. Changes go through Git review and `terraform plan` before `apply`.

### 6.7 Network security

CA APIs listen on loopback only; the CA host has no public web ingress; public services are behind a load balancer with Cloud Armor rate limits.

### 6.8 Time

CA hosts and the TSA use Google infrastructure time; the TSA continuously cross-checks against NIST time servers (§4).

## 7. Certificate, CRL and OCSP profiles

### 7.1 Certificate profile (all)

X.509 v3; serial numbers ≥ 64 bits from a CSPRNG, positive, ≤ 20 octets; ECDSA P-384 with SHA-384 (OCSP responders: P-384 from the rebuild onward); `subjectKeyIdentifier` per RFC 7093; `authorityKeyIdentifier`; CRL distribution point and AIA (`caIssuers`, OCSP) over HTTP.

| Certificate | basicConstraints | keyUsage | extendedKeyUsage | certificatePolicies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Root | CA, (no pathLen) | keyCertSign, cRLSign | — | — |
| Intermediate | CA, pathLen 1 | keyCertSign, cRLSign | serverAuth†, codeSigning, timeStamping, emailProtection, documentSigning, licensing (`.1.4.1`) | `.1.2.1`, `.1.2.2` + CPS URI |
| Code Signing Issuing CA | CA, pathLen 0 | keyCertSign, cRLSign | serverAuth†, codeSigning | `.1.2.1`, `.1.2.2` |
| Document Signing Issuing CA | CA, pathLen 0 | keyCertSign, cRLSign | serverAuth†, documentSigning (`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.36`), emailProtection | `.1.2.1`, `.1.2.2` |
| Timestamping Issuing CA | CA, pathLen 0 | keyCertSign, cRLSign | serverAuth†, timeStamping | `.1.2.1` |
| Licensing Issuing CA | CA, pathLen 0 | keyCertSign, cRLSign | `1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.4.1` | `.1.2.1` |
| Signers | not CA (critical) | digitalSignature (critical) | per issuing CA | `.1.2.1` |
| TSA signer | not CA | digitalSignature | timeStamping only, **critical** | `.1.2.1` |
| Operator-issued leaves | not CA | per template | per template | `.1.2.2` |

No CA certificate ever carries `OCSPSigning` or `anyExtendedKeyUsage`. No policy constraints.

† **serverAuth and name constraints.** Each online issuing CA runs in step-ca, which serves its API over TLS with a certificate it issues itself from that CA; standard clients reject that certificate unless serverAuth is permitted down the chain. serverAuth therefore appears on the intermediate and the online issuing CAs, and the intermediate carries **critical name constraints** permitting only `DNS:localhost`, `IP:127.0.0.1/32` and `IP:::1/128`. No CA under the NetStable intermediate can issue a TLS certificate valid for any real hostname. Signer identities are URIs, which these constraints do not restrict.

Document and advisory files verified with cosign use signers from the **Code Signing** CA, because cosign requires the codeSigning purpose; the Document Signing CA serves human-facing signatures (PDF, S/MIME).

### 7.2 CRL profile

X.509 v2 CRLs with CRL number and authority key identifier. Online issuing CAs: `nextUpdate` 24 hours, regenerated every 16 hours and on revocation. Root and intermediate: `nextUpdate` ≤ 6 months, re-signed every 3–5 months at a ceremony.

### 7.3 OCSP profile

RFC 6960; delegated responder certificate per issuing CA with `id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck`; responses valid ≤ 1 hour for online CAs; unknown serial numbers answered `revoked` with the extended-revoked extension.

### 7.4 Trust anchor

| Root | Status | SHA-256 fingerprint |
|---|---|---|
| NetStable, LLC Root CA v2 | current (2026-09-26 → 2046-09-26) | `7b5834c61086dfd79f9402e95579741ff0e3c5f2f3944e3f2453daf1deaf7a83` |
| NetStable, LLC Root CA v1 | trusted until retirement (Phase 4) | `622540676a092c5aaa95a3ec9f07afdbbd34d640d27ca41c17e80584d2f60d72` |

## 8. Compliance audit

Self-assessment against this CP/CPS at least yearly, plus the quarterly external log review (§5.2). No WebTrust or ETSI audit (not required for a private PKI). Findings go to `operations/drift.md`.

## 9. Other business and legal matters

Certificates are issued at no charge and only for NetStable's own products and people. NetStable provides the PKI "as is" to relying parties, limits liability to the extent permitted by law, and publishes relying-party verification instructions (`09-using-the-pki.md`). Governing law: Commonwealth of Virginia. (To be reviewed by counsel before version 1.0.)

## 10. Current deviations and transition (v1 generation)

| # | Statement | Current state | Fix | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-01 | FIPS 140 Level 3 HSM (§6.2) | Cloud HSM is FIPS 140-2 L3 (Historical) | Accepted 2026-09-26: build on Cloud HSM; migrate to a FIPS 140-3 HSM by parallel hierarchy when Google validates or a customer requires it (`12` §2.1) | tracked |
| T-02 | No standing CA-key access (§5.2 item 1) | Operator holds `owner` with sign/destroy on all keys | Break-glass account; PAM-only; IAM deny | Phase 1 |
| T-03 | CA keys disabled between ceremonies | Root/intermediate versions enabled | Disable after each ceremony | Phase 1 |
| T-04 | Independent alerts | None | Log-based alerts to an external address | Phase 1 |
| T-05 | Locked logs, 2 years | BigQuery, unlocked | Locked log bucket | Phase 1 |
| T-06 | CA keys issue only (§1.3) | Two CI identities and Harbor can sign with CA keys | Signer keys; remove bindings | Phase 2 |
| T-07 | certificatePolicies, EKU on CAs (§7.1) | Absent in v1 | **Done in v2** (2026-09-26) | v2 |
| T-08 | TSA policy OID `.1.3.1` | Sigstore OID | **Done** 2026-09-26 (TSA moved to v2) | done |
| T-09 | Root 20 y; Timestamping CA 6 y | 25 y; 8 y in v1 | **Done in v2** | v2 |
| T-10 | Root/intermediate CRL ≤ 6 months | 397 days | Next ceremony | Phase 1 |
| T-11 | OCSP `revoked` for unknown serials | `good` | pki-ocsp change | Phase 1 |
| T-12 | Witnessed ceremonies | v2 ceremony (2026-09-26) witnessed by the Operator only, logged and recorded (`pki/ceremonies/2026-09-26-v2.md`) | External Witness from the next ceremony (G3) | next ceremony |
| T-13 | Multi-region keys | v1 in us-east1 | **Done in v2** (location `us`) | v2 |
| T-14 | Separate test root | None | Create | Phase 2 |

## History

- 2026-09-26 — Draft 0.1 written; not yet approved.
- 2026-09-26 — Draft 0.2: generation v2 built (names, profiles incl. serverAuth + name constraints, root fingerprint, deviation status). Published at https://pki.netstable.io/cps/ as a draft.
